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Diane Marie Amann

Children withstand unique harms in periods of armed conflict and similar violence. Whether infants or juveniles, during such periods children
often are among the most vulnerable persons. Children typically depend
on their elders for sustenance, and so the loss of parents or other guardians, coupled with the destruction of homes, displacement from communities, and deprivation of basic necessities, education, or health care,
affects them acutely. Some children do not survive war; others subsist
along war's waysides. Still others find themselves in armed groups, where
they may be required to aid or participate in combat and, at times, to
endure sexual or other physical assault. In recognition of such experiences, Raphael Lemldn, a foundational figure in the development of international criminal law, once wrote: The permanent psychological injury
and the arrest of normal development of the ch ild victim is perhaps the
most shocking and tragic result of genocide.''
Stories of such children have been told and retold, not only in recent
memoirs like A Long Way Gone, an accou nt of armed conflicts in 1990s
West Africa, but also in much older ones like the world-famous diary
of Anne Frank, a European teenager who lost her battle to hide from
the Holocaust. 2 Frank's story reflected a myriad of children's experiences
during the Second World War. Nevertheless, early international criminal
justice mechanisms paid scant attention to children's wartime plight.
Neither the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which
This chapter is written solely in my personal capacity. My thanks to Stephany
Sheriff for research assistance.
I Stephen L. Jacobs, ed., Lemkin

0 11

Ge11 ocicle, Lanham: Lexington Books,

201 2, p. 33.
2 Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier, New Yor_k: Sarah
Crichton Books/ Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007; Anne Frank, The Diary of a
Young Girl, New York: Random House/Everyman·s Library, 2010.
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tried accused major war criminals in Germany, nor Control Council law
No. 10, upon which twelve subsequent Nuremberg trials were based, made
any mention of children. The sa me was true of the 1946 Charter establishing the Tokyo Tribu nal. Even the seminal instrument of post-war collective secu rity, the Charter of the United Nations, was silent with respect
to children. In stark contrast were institutions established at the turn of

the twenty-first century. The statutes of both the Special Court for Sierra
Leone and the International Criminal Court place emphasis on crimes
against children, and both courts have convicted individuals charged with
such crimes. The initial focus, on the recruitment and use of child soldiers,
eventually shifted towards a more comprehensive approach. International
Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has explained that 'in addition
to focusing on children who are forced to carry arms, we must also
address the issue of children who are affected by arms'. 3 This chapter
first will trace developments that gave rise to the current emphasis, and
then will examine key judgments as well as the recent move to a broader
strategy. It will conclude by d iscussing challenges to the prevention and
punishment of international crimes aga inst children.

Towards accountability for crimes against children
Despite their charters' silence on the issue, the post-Second World War
tribunals did not wholly ignore the effects of armed co nflict on children.
The first Nu remberg judgment contained a dozen such references. Most
were brief mentions of children in the company of adults; for example,
an Ei11satzgruppe leader's statement that his unit had 'liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women and children'. 4 To the sa me effect were most
of the five references to children in the Tokyo Tribunal's 1948 judgment5
Still, vulnerabilities attached to chi ldhood were central to the Nuremberg
judgment's discussions of certain Nazi practices, such as abduction and
forced adoption in order to boost the number of persons presumed to possess what one w itness called 'good blood of our type', and forced abortion
3 Fatou Bensouda, 'Children and Internatio nal Criminal Justice', (2015) 43
Georgia Journal of lntemarional and Comparative Law forthcoming (internal
quotations omitted; emphasis in the original).
4 (1948) 22 IMT 491.
5 B. V. A. Roling and C. F. Ruter, eds., The Tokyo Judgment, vol. J, Amsterdam: APA
University Press, 1977, pp. 96, 388-9, 396, 399.

Children
if, in the words of another witness, 'the child's parentage would not meet
the racial standards'.6 Finding that the Nazis routinely had killed captives too
young to work in concentration camps, the International Military Tribunal
quoted from an official's affidavit: 'Very frequently women would hide their
children under their clothes, but of course when we found them we would
send the cbiJdren in to be exterminated. '7 Testimony at trial connected killings of children to the Nazis' ultimate goal: to eliminate an ethno-religious
group.•
That annihilative intent- precisely, the 'intent to destroy, in whole or
in pan, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group'-was proscribed in
a foremost instrument of modem international criminal law, the Convention
on Genocide that the UN General Assembly approved in December 1948. The
brainchild of LemJdn, this treaty ai med squarely at Second World War practices like forced adoption, and thus listed '[Oorcibly transferring children' of
a protected group to another group as one of the ftve acts that might constitute genocide. The treaty reached criminality against future generations as
well, forbidding the imposition of 'measures intended to prevent births' in a
protected group.
As the onset of the Cold War stymied the enforcement o f such prohibitions,
States spoke more of protecting children from harm than of prosecuting
harm once it occurred. The General Assembly endorsed the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaimed that '(m]otherhood and
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance', and that '[a)ll children,
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the sa me social protection',
including free education 'at least in the elementary and fundamental stages'.
In 1949, States adopted the Geneva Conventions for the protection of victims of war, the fourth of which co ntained multiple provisions intended
to assure the identification, education, health, and well-being of infants
and other children, during armed connict and under occupation.9 The 1977
Additional Protocols to those universally ratified conventions reinforced this
6 (1948) 22 IMT 480.
7 Ibid., p. 503.
8 (1947) 4 IMT 337-338 (cross-examination of Ohlendorf).
9 Convention (No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civi li an Persons in Time of
War, (1950) 75 UNTS 287, articles 14, 17, 23, 24, 38(5), 50, 82, 89, 94, 132.
This protective array compares favourably to a legal regulation issued duri~g
the United States Civil War: its sole reference to children recommended, yet did
not require, notice of attack 'so that the non-combatants, and especially th~
women and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences.
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regime. 10 The contours of protection took shape with the adoption of the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child a nd the 1990 African Charter
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, each of which embraced as general
principles recognition of the child's rights to life and to express views in
matters affecting him or her, as well as guarantees o f non-discrimination
and action in a child's best interests.
These latter treaties also helped to restart efforts at prohibitio n; precisely, prohibition of the use or recruitment of children in armed service. Additional Protocol I provides that '[p]arties to the conflict shall
take all feasible measures in order that children ... do not take a direct
part in hostilities', and further specifies that such parties 'shall refrain
from recruiting' children under f1heen 'into their armed fo rces', while
Additional Protocol 11 states that 'chi ldren ... s hall neither be recruited
in the armed fo rces or grou ps nor allowed to take part in hostilities'. In
the Children's Convention, meanwhile, States Parties similarly promise
to 'take all feasible measures' so that young persons 'do not take a direct
part in hostilities', and also to ' refrain from recruiting any person who
has not attained the age of 15 years into their a rmed forces'. The African
Children's Charter follows sui t, with an important innovation: whereas
previous treaties limited the recruitment-and-use ban to children who
had not yet attained their fiheenth birthday, this regional child rights
instrument extended that ban to everyone under eigh teen. Subsequent
treaties, such as the 1999 Co nvention on the Wo rst Forms of Child Labour
and the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict, also opt for the eighteen -year-old threshold.
The promulgation of these overl apping and sometimes contradictory
treaties coincided with a Cold War thaw a nd consequent revival of the
international criminal justice project begun in the Nuremberg-Tokyo era.
The new tribunals drew note for pioneering jurisprudence with regard
to sexual and gender-based violence - crimes that their mid-twentieth

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Orders No. 100, article 19.
10 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (1979)
1125 UNTS 3, articles 70(1), 76-8; Protocol Il Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, a nd rel ating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-Internatio nal Armed Conflicts, ( 1979) 1125 UNTS 609, articles 4(3), 6(4).
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century forebears had afforded a secondary priority. 11 Like lhose forebears,
however, the new tribunals did nol dwell upon crimes against children.
That changed after news dispatches and Grar;a Machel's 1996 UN report
alerted public opinion to the prevalence of children - some younger than
ten - in the ranks of national armies and rebel groups that lhen were
waging wars across the globe. 12
The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the
2002 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, therefore, both authorised war crimes prosecutions for the conscriplion, enlistment, and use of
children in armed forces. Yet both statutes confined the courts' jurisdiction to the recruitment or use of children under fifteen, notwithstanding
the higher age Limit adopted in contemporaneous child rights treaties.
In other respects, however, both statutes were products of a child rights
vanguard, represented at the 1998 Rome Conference by UNICEF and an
active children's caucus of non-governmental organisations, and by a
similar coalition in the run-up to the adoption of the 2002 Special Court
Statute.° For example, abuse of girls and abduction of girls, proscribed
under pre-existing Sierra Leonean law, were enumerated as crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Special Court. An initial proposal to operate a
Special Court juvenile chamber was set aside. Although lhat Court's statute
did authorise the prosecution of children as young as fifteen, it mandated
that anyone convicted of a crime committed when he or she was between

II E.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T) , Judgme nt, 2 September 1998;
Prosecutorv. Kunarac et al. (IT-96-23 El IT-96-23/ 10), Judgment, 12 June 2002.
12 Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Report of the Expert of the
Secretary-General, Ms Gra\a Machel, s ubmitted pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 48/157, UN Doc. A/51/306, paras. 34-62. The Machel Report
inspired the establishment of an office to coordinate efforts among UN entities including the Security Council. See Office of the Special Representative
to the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, The Six Gra11e

Violations Againsr Children During Armed Conjlicr: The Legal Foundarion
(November 2009).
13 Per Saland 'International Criminal Law Principles·, in Roy S. Lee, ed., The

llltematio11~I Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues,
Negoriations, Resulrs, The Hague/Lo ndon/Bosto n: Kluwer Law International,
1999, pp. 189-216, at p. 20 1; llene Cohn, 'The Protection of Children an~ the
Quest for Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone·, (2001) 55 Jou ma I of lntematronal

Affairs I, at p. 19.
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fifteen and eighteen years old would be subject not to imprisonment but
rather to rehabilitation and societal reintegration. 14
As for the Rome Statute, concern for young people is manifest in
the very preamble: 'Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity'. The drafters declared they were
establishing the International Criminal Court 'for the sake of present and
future generations'. Article 36 of the Statute requires States Parties to
'take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on ...
violence against women or children', and article 42 further authorises
the Prosecutor to 'appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues,
including ... violence against chi ldren'. Additional provisions instruct
Court officials to accommodate the needs of child victims and witnesses. 15
What is more, article 26 of the Rome Statute not only excludes from the
Court's jurisdiction 'any person who was under 18 at the time of the
alleged commission of a crime', even as other provisions confer jurisdiction over adults for a range of crimes against children. Apparently not
content simply to list so-called generic offences li ke killing or pillaging,
which affect adults as well as children, 16 the drafters enumerated multiple
child-specific crimes: genocide involving the forcible transfer of children; the c rime against humanity of enslavement, denned with express
reference to the trafficking of children; and, of course, the war crimes
of conscription, enlistment, and use of children in armed groups. Also
listed are numerous crimes that keenly affect children and future generations: prevention of births as genocide; sexual slavery, forced pregnancy,
or enforced sterilisation as crimes aga inst humanity or war crimes; and
attacks on schools and hospitals as war crimes. Sexual slavery of children is expressly mentioned in the Elements of Crimes. Children similarly
would suffer unique harm from the crim e against humanity of persecution, if perpetrated by reason of the victim's age.
14 Diane Marie Amann, 'Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile
Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone·, (2001) 29 Pepperdi11e Law
Rei•iew 167.
15 Rome Statute, articles 54( 1)(b), 68( 1), (2). See also article 84 (authorising
pos~ humous revision of sentence on request of a convicted person·s child).
16 Cecile Aptel, 'Unpunished Crimes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and
Children', in Charles Jalloh, ed., The Sierra Leone Special Court a11d Its Legacy,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 20 14, pp. 340-60, at p. 341, n.3.
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Given these developments, it is little surprise that c rimes against children figured prominently in the work of both the International Criminal
Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. As discussed below, although
decisions in the latter Court concentrated on child soldiering, over time
the docket of the International Criminal Court grew to include additional
charges involving child victims.

Special Court for Sierra Leone and crimes against children
Endemic during the 1990s civil war that wracked Sierra Leone were
accounts of young people - sometimes, very young ch ildren - who toted
AK-47s and committed atrocities. Typical was the 1999 report of a teenaged veteran who boasted: 'We attacked everybody. We feared nobody.
We were very bold. Everybody is knowing our hot tempers.' 17 Stories
of such children, and of persons of all ages victimised by their actions,
stirred what has been called t h e 'international legal imagination', 18 and
so led to the legal developments just discussed. ln the end, Special Coun
prosecutors chose not to exercise their statutory authority to charge persons as young as fifteen; nor did they allege crimes against girls pursuant to the incorpo rated Sierra Leonea n law. 19 Prosecutors did, however,
pursue charges related to the recruitment and use of child soldiers.
The prohibition against c hild soldiering survived an early challenge
in the Special Court. In Prosecutor v . Norman , a former Sierra Leonean
government minister accused of recruitin g or using chi ldren under fifteen
in a pro-government militia asserted that such conduct was not criminal under customary international law. Over t he dissent of one judge, a
four-member Appeals Chamber held otherwise. Surveying the evolution
of the prohibition contained in the Special Court's statute, the majority

17 Josep Sonah, then nineteen, quoted in Colin Nickerson, "Albright to see Peace's
High Price in Sierra Leone' , Boston Globe, 18 October 1999, P· A I.
18 Mark A. Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 9.
19 Cecile Aptel, 'Unpunished Crimes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and
Children', in Charles Jalloh, ed., The Sierra Leone Special Courr and Its
Legacy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014, PP· 340-360, at P· ~56;
David M. Crane, ·Prosecuting Children in Times of Conflict: The West Afn can
Experience', (2008) 15/3 Human Rights Brief 11.
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ruled, first, that a n 'overwhelming majority of States' did not recruit such
children and in fact had 'criminal ised suc h behaviour' at the time in question, a nd second, that the government of Sierra Leone was on notice of
this 'customary norm'. 20 One commentator saw in this 2004 decision 'the
begi nning of a trend ... to take seriously the issue of crimes concerning
children, and to prosecute those responsible for such v iolations, both to
exact retribution from the offender, as well as to send a message of deterrence to othe rs'. 21
Consequent efforts at prosecution nevertheless met with mixed results.
The accused in No rman died before th e Trial Chamber's verdict issued. In
that verd ict, one co-accused was acquitted of the child-soldiering count,
and the child-soldiering con viction of the third co-accused was overturned o n ap peal. 22 In contrast, in the two cases involving leaders of rebel
groups, a ll but one accused was convicted at trial of recruiting or using
child soldie rs, and all five such convictions were susta ined on appeal.21
The Special Court's final trial resulted in th e conviction of former Liberian
President Charles Taylor on eleven counts, including a charge of aiding and abetting the rebel gro ups' recrui t ment or use of boys and girls
under fiftee n. 24 In 20 13 that judgment, plus another imposing a sentence
of fifty years in prison, withstood the accused's appellate challenge.25
The 349-page appeals judgment deta iled fmdings not only of systematic
harms that children suffered in armed gro ups, but also of sexual and
gender-based vio lence against v icti ms described as 'women and girls',
without further age differentiation .26

20 Prosec:u1or v. Norman (SCSL-04-14-AR-72(E)), Decision on Preliminary
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisd iction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004,
paras. 5 1-2.
2 1 Max du Plessis, 'Children under lnternationaJ Criminal Law', (2004) 1J African
Sec11riry Rei•iew 103, at p. 108.
22 Prosec111or v. Fofa11a et a l. (SCSL- 04- 14-A), Appeals Judgment, 28 May 2008.
23 Prosec11tor v. Sesay et aJ. (SCSL-04- 15-A), Appeals Judgment, 26 October
2009; Prosec11ror v. Brima et a l. (SCSL-04- 16-A), Appeals Judgment, 22
February 2008.
2 4 Prosec11torv. Tay/or(SCSL-03-0 1-T) Judgment, 30 May 201 2.
2
5 P~osec11 tor v. Taylor (SCSL-03-01 -A), Appeals Judgme nt, 26 September 201 3.
26 Ibid., paras. 260-73.
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Early child-specific jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Court
By the time the Special Court's Appeals Chamber issu ed its judgment in
Taylor, the International Criminal Court already had concluded two tri-

als involving child-soldiering charges, agai nst t hree defendants. Another
person accused of crimes inv olving children was in custody following
his surrender to the court, and a handful o f others so charged remained
at large.
The first International Criminal Court trial, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, pertained exclusively to allegations that the accused, a former leader of a
Congolese rebel group, was responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for
the war crimes of 'co nsc ripting o r e nlisting c hildre n under the age of
15 years ... or using them to p a rticipate actively in hostilities'. This si ngular focus signalled '[t]hat children come first, at the top of our contemporary priorities when dealing with the victims of armed co nflict',
one commentator wrote.27 The focus on childre n drew sustained criticism,
however, from victims' g roups and other non -governmental orga nisations usually supportive of th e Office of the Prosecu to r; they complained
in particular that despite available evide nce, sex ua l and gender-based
crimes had not been ch a rged. 28 The Trial Chamber would echo such c riti cism in its post-trial judgments.
Compounding these difficulties, the reliance on child victims in
Lubanga soo n gave rise to problems of proof. The very first w itness began
his testimony by recanting a prior statemen t that he had bee n abducted
and fo rced to serve as a child so ldier in the defendant's militia. Trial was
put on hold for a week, a nd eve nt ually the w itness testified in acco rdance with the prior statement. In its verdict, however, the Trial Chamber
rejected as unreli able n ot just his testimony but t h at of all witnesses

27 William A. Schabas, 'Commentary on: Children a nd Armed Con fl ict', in Noelle
Quenivet and Shilan Shah-Davis, eds., Jnternatio11al Law and Anned Conflict,
The Hague: TMC·Asser Press, 2010, pp. 283-7, at p. 283.
28 Margaret M. deGuzman , ' Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection a~ the

International Criminal Court' (201 2) 33 Michigan Journal of International
Law 265, at p. 273. See Di an~ Marie Amann, 'Child ren and th~ F~t Verdict
of the International Criminal Court·, (2013) 12 Washington Unwers,ry Global

Studies Law Review 4 11 , at pp. 424-8.
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who said they had been child sold iers. Yet it credited the testimony of
two experts and of a UN official w ho h a d worked with child combatants
demobilised after the Congolese co nflict. Pivotal was the Trial Chamber's
viewing of a video in whlch the defendant ralli ed troops while surrounded
by bodyguards who, in the eyes of the judges, were 'recrui ts who were
clearly under the age of 15'.29 In a trilogy of 2012 decisions, therefore,
the Trial Chamber: convicted the d efendant of conscription, enlistment,
and use in a non-internation al a rmed conflict; imposed a concurrent
fourteen-year sentence; a nd outlined a framework fo r the award of reparations to victims of the crimes of co nvi ction.
Late in 2014, a majority of the five-member Appeals Chamber sustained
the conviction and sentence in Lubanga.30 ln so doing, it issued a number of
important rulings with respect to child-soldiering cri mes. First, it rejected the
defence challenge to the man ner by which child victims had been determined
to meet the Rome Statute's age threshold. The Appeals Chamber ruled that
' it suffices that it is established that the v icti m is within a certain age range,
namely under the age of 15 years', and further held that in the absence of
precise records, age is a factual finding to be determined case-by-case.11 It
also accepted the testimony about children's ages that the judgment below
credited, as well as the trial judges' fmding that the rally video depicted child
soldiers under f1fteen. 12 Second, the Appeals Chamber clarified the relationship between 'conscripting' and 'enlisting' children. The defence in Lubanga
had argued that the Trial Chamber e rred as a matter of law when it wrote that
conscription, or forcible recruitment, a nd enl istment, or voluntary enrolment,
'are dealt with together'.33 The Appeals Chamber stressed that the two crimes

29 Prosecutor v. Luba11ga (ICC-0 I /04-0 J-06), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of
the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 792.
30 Prosecurorv. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-0 1/06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo aga inst his Conviction, I December 2014; Prosecuror
v. Luba11ga (ICC-01/04-01/06 A 4 A 6), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo against the 'Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of
the Statute·, I December 2014. Judge Anita Usacka would have reversed the
co~viction on grounds of insufficient evidence, whi le Judge Sang-Hyun Song
obJected to the majority's treatment of child-soldieri ng crimes.
31 Prosecutorv. Luba11ga (ICC-01/04-01 /06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his Conviction, I December 2014, para. 198
(emphasis in the original).
32 Ibid., paras. 207-62. 33 Ibid., para. 268.
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are distinct because only conscription entails an element of compulsion,
and it next found in the trial record sufficient evidence of such compulsion.
A related defence argument, that conviction for conscription depended upon
proof of lack of consent by the child, was dismissed; 'the elements of these
crimes', the Chamber explained, 'focus on the conduct of the perpetrator'.34
Finally, the Appeals Chamber weighed in on how to interpret 'using ...

ro participate actively in hostilities', a statutory phrase with which other
judges in the International Criminal Court and in the Special Court for
Sierra Leone already had grappled. In Lubanga, the Trial Chamber majority had ruled that the phrase encompassed not only front-line combat,
but also situations when 'support provided by the child to the combatants
exposed him or her to a rea l danger as a potential target'. 35 The lone dissenter preferred a much broader interpretation. Arguing that the phrase
encompassed not only supportive roles within a zone of danger, but also
'the sexual violence and other ill-treatment suffered by girls and boys·,
without regard to location, she wrote: 'The use of yo ung girls' and boys'
bodies by combatants within or outside the group is a war crime and
as such encoded in the charges against the accused '.36 On appeal, the
defence characterised even the majority's middle-path interpretation as
too broad. It endeavoured to equate ' using .. . to participate actively in
hostilities' with 'direct participation', an international humanitarian law
concept that defines who is protected, and who may be targeted for killing, in times of armed co n flict. 37 The Appeals Chamber rejected this claim
of interchangeability. But it also rejected the Trial Chamber majority's
construction, in favour of its own ' plain interpretation of the relevant
provisions in their context'; in brief, the Appeals Chamber held that the
crime of using children depends on proof of a 'link between the activity

34 Ibid., para. 302.
35 Prosecutor v. Luba11ga (ICC-Ol /04-0 1-06), Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of
the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 627.
36 Prosecutorv. Luba11ga (ICC-01/04-01-06), Separate a nd Dissenting. Opi~i~n of
Judge Odio Benito, 14 March 20 12, paras. 16, 2 1 (punctuation as m ongmal).
37 Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of
Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his Conviction, 1 December ~0 14, paras.
315-20 (citing, inter alia, Additional Protocol 1, article 51(3), which exten~
10
protections to civilians ·unless and for such time as they take a direct part
hostilities').
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for which the child is used and the co mbat in wh ich the armed force or
group of the perpetrator is engaged'.38
Reluctant to delineate proscribed and permitted uses 'in view of the
complex and unforeseeable scenarios presented by the rapidly changing
face of warfare in the modern world', the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga
called for case-by-case analysis. 39 It drew gujdance from International
Committee of the Red Cross commentaries, which included witrun the
meaning of use 'military operations such as gathering information,
transmitting orders, transporting ammun itions and foodstuffs, or acts of
sabotage·, as well as 'gathering and transmjssion of military information, transportation of arms and munitions, prov ision of supplies etc'.4°
Also consulted was a draft Rome Statute report, which included 'military activities linked to com bat such as scouting, spying, sabotage and
the use of children as decoys, courie rs or at military checkpoints', and
excluded 'activities clearly unrelated to the hostilities such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff in an officer's married
accommodation'.41 Sexual violence and other conduct of concern to the
dissenter in the Lubanga tri al judgment clearly fell outside the bounds
of this construction. With in the posited meaning of use, however, was
conduct for which the Trial Chamber had ruled t he defendant responsible: 'the deployment of children under the age of fifteen years as soldiers
and their participation in combat, as well as their use as military guards
and bodyguards', as the Appea ls Chamber described it.42 Accordingly, the
International Criminal Court's first tria l concluded with affirmance of the
judgment of conviction for crimes of child soldiering.

Acquittals in child-soldiering cases
The Internacional Criminal Court's second trial took a turn very different
from the proceedings in Lubanga. At issue was an attack that a rival rebel
group had launched on a single day in Bogoro, a Congolese village said
to harbour members of the militia over whlch the defendant in Lubanga
once presided. Two leaders of that riva l group stood trial in Prosecuror
38
39
41
42

Ibid., paras. 333, 335; see also para. 324.
Ibid., para. 335.
40 Ibid., para. 334.
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 340; see also paras. 341-433.
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v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, for multiple crimes against civilia ns, including
the use of 'childre n under I 5 yea rs for mul t ipl e purposes a nd to participate actively ... prior to, during, an d following t he attack'.43 The cases
were severed after trial concluded in 20 12, yet in the e nd, both defendants
were acquitted of the child-soldi erin g offence.
Before detailing its reasons for acqui tting the defendant in Ngudjolo
on all counts, the Trial Cha mbe r, in a judgmen t subsequently upheld on
appeal, emphasised its adhe rence to the Rome Statute provision that presumes innocence unless a nd until an accused is proved gui lty 'au-de/a
de tout doute raisonnable' -literally, ' beyond every reasonable doubt'. 44
It then ruled that essential facts had not been proved. As in lubanga,

judges found fa ult with persons w ho had testified that they were militia
members. Concluding after extended analysis that t hree such prosecution witnesses were 'imprecise' an d 'contradictory', the Chamber rejected
their testimony in its entirety.45 Unlike in Lubanga , in Ngudjolo the same
fate befell videos introduced in to evidence, all of which post-dated the
attack. 46 The Trial Chamber did find th at the presence of child combatants
was 'un plzenomene generalise', o r 'a widespread phenomenon', during
the period in question, and further that 'children under 15 years, so me
carrying blades, ... were present' at the attack itself. 47 Nevertheless, with
respect to allegations that the accused had ordered military training for
underage children or used t h em as bo dygua rds or fo r other purposes,
the Chamber wrote in its 201 2 judgment of acquittal that the credited
evidence failed to esta blish t he requis ite nexus between the accused a nd
child soldiers.48

43 Prosecutor v. Ngudjo/o (I CC-Ol /04-02/ l 2), Jugement Rendu en Application de
!'article 74 du Statut, 18 Dece mber 20 12, pa ra. 504 (brackets around ellipsis
and internal quotations om itted); Prosecutor v. Kata11ga (ICC-01/04-01/07),
Jugement Rendu en Application de !'articl e 74 du Statut, 7 March 2014,

para. 1025.
44 Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo (ICC- 01 /04-02/ 12), Jugement Rendu en Application de
l'anicle 74 du Statut, 18 December 2012, para. 35. See Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo
(ICC-01/04-02/ 12 A), Judgment on the Prosecutor's Appeal against the Decision of Trial Chamber II entitled 'Judgment Pursua nt to Article 74 of the
Statute', 27 February 20 15.
45 Ibid., paras. 157-9, 189-90, 2 18- 9.
46 Ibid., paras. 444, 463, 480, 500.
47 Ibid. , para. 5 16.
48 Ibid.
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The defendant in Kata11ga likew ise was acquitted of c hild soldiering,
even though he was convicted on other counts in a judgment issued
early in 20 14. Considerable evidence had revealed 'a s ignificant phenomenon of the utilisation of child sold iers, aged seven to seventeen
years, integrated into the ranks of different armed groups then active',
the same Trial Chamber which had passed judgment in Ngudjolo wrote
in Katanga. 49 During the attack on Bogoro out of which the case arose,
'children armed w ith guns, machetes, lances or arrows, fought alongside combatants', the Chamber continued; moreover, the evidence
established that so me of th ose children were younger than fifteen. 50 Yet
no conviction issued. Doubts abo u t some witnesses' reliability, coupled
with uncertai nty about specific ch ild soldiers' ages, compelled the conclusion that the defe ndant o n tri a l had not been proved responsible for
the prohibited use of underage c hildren. 51

A more comprehensive policy on children
While these prosecutions for the rec rui tment a nd use of child soldiers
were unfolding, the Court's second Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, assumed
office. The transition marked a change in strategy. The decision to charge
only child-soldie ring offences in Lubanga had provoked objections
from judges, victi ms, and commen tators alike, and proceedings before
and during trial had laid ba re investigative a nd eviden tiary challenges.
Commentary also took note of the complex nature of child soldiering.
Although many children were victims kidnapped into armed groups and
forced to wield weapo ns, other ch ildren chose to do so, even though the
law declined to g ive weig ht to their offers of consent; moreover, child
combatants who com mitted international crimes victimised others, persons also deserving of redress. Jnc reasingly, expansive interpretations of
the s tatutory phrase 'using ... to participate actively in hostilities' were
said also to expa nd the scope of c hild ren who might become legitimate

49 Prosecutor v. Kata11ga (ICC-01/04- 01 /07), Jugement Rendu en Application de
rarticle 74 du Statut, 7 March 20 14, para. 1052; see also paras. 1053-9.
50 Ibid., paras. 1060, 1065; see also paras. 1061-4.
51 Ibid., paras. 1066- 88. The trial judgment became fi nal after the withdrawal of
cross-appeals; the defendant is serving a twelve-year sentence on the counts
for which he was convicted.
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targets of warfare. 52 Perhaps in tacit recognition of considerations like
these, shortly before taking office in mid 2012 Bensouda made a statement
she would often repeat: 'Our focus sh ould shift from "children with arms"
to "children who are affected by the arms" in the context of the crime of
enlisting and conscriptin g child soldiers'. 53 The Office of the Prosecutor
subsequently identified 'particula r attention to ... crimes against children'
as one of its six strategic goals, and began preparing a Policy Paper on
Children, a process that included consultations with experts in academia
and civil society. 54
International Criminal Court judges, meanwhile, agreed to enlarge the
scope of proceedings in one case involving offences against children. To
be precise, in 2012 judges approved a request from the Prosecutor to supplement the initial arrest warrant for a fugitive Congolese rebel leader
who had been accused solely of child-soldiering crimes in 2006, at the
same time as his alleged ally, the defendant in Lubanga. 55 Bosco Ntaganda
surrendered in 2013 to face charges that he was responsible not only
for the prohibited conscription, enl istment, and use of children, but also
for a range of generic crimes, and for the wa r crimes of rape and sexual slavery perpetrated by his troops against children under fifteen in
the same militia.56 Before a Pre-Trial Chamber, he contended that 'the
crimes of rape and sexual slavery aga inst these persons are not foreseen
by the Statute, as international humanitarian law does not protect persons taking part in hostilities from crimes committed by other persons
52 E.g., Roman Graf, 'The In ternational Crim inal Court a nd Child Soldiers: An
Appraisal of the Lubanga Judgment', (2012) JO Journal ofinternational Criminal
Justice 1, at pp. 16-2 1; Chris J enks, ' Law as Shield, Law as Sword: The ICC's
Lubanga Decision, Child Sold ie rs and the Perverse Mutualism of Participation
in Hostilities', (2013) 3 University of Miami National Security and Armed

Co11jlict law Review 106.
53 Fatou Bensouda, 'The Incidence of the Female Child Soldier and the
International Criminal Court', 4 June 2012, keynote speech before the Eng
Aja Eze Foundation in New York.
54 Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan June 2012-2015, 11 October 2013,
para. 3.
55 Prosecutor v. Ntaganda (ICC-01 /04-02/06), Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application under Article 58, 12 July 2012.
7
56 Prosecutor v. Ntaga11da (lCC-0 1/04-02/06), Decision Pursuant to Article 6J( )
(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of t he Prosecutor against Bosco
Ntaganda, 9 June 2014, paras. 36, 7 4.
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taking part in hostilities on the sa me side of the a rmed contlict:57 The
Chamber disagreed. It noted that common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions protects '[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities',
while Additional Protocol U protects 'persons w ho do not take a direct
part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities', a nd forbids in particular 'rape, enforced prostitution and any form o f indece nt assault against
persons·.ss The Pre-Trial Chamber then proceeded to conside r whether the
child soldiers in question 'were taki ng direct/active part in hostilities at
the time they were victims of acts of rape and/or sexual slavery'. 59 That
framing virtually compelled a negative reply. As stated by the Pre-Trial
Chamber:
[T]hose subject to rape and/or sexual enslavement cannot be considered to
have taken active part in hostilities during the specific time when they were
subject to acts of sex ual nature, including rape, as defined in the relevant
Elements of Crimes. The sexual character of these crimes, which involve
elements of force/coercion or the exercise of rights of ownership, logically
preclude active participation in hostilities at the sa me t ime. 60
The conclusion jibed with that of the Special Court for Sierra Leone trial
verdict in Taylor, as the Pre-Trial Chamber recognised. 61 But in the earlier
case the indictment had not specified sexua l abuse against child soldiers;
rather, the Special Court's reasoning arose out of the facts as adduced at
trial, as proof of more generic charges. The confirmation of these rape and
sexual slavery charges in Ntaganda thus was a milestone. Combined with
the confirmation of additional, generic charges, it suggested a new receptivity to including, within the narrative of International Criminal Court
proceedings, the full range of children's experiences am id armed conflict
and analogous violence.62

57
58
60
62

Tbid., para. 76 (parenthetical acronym omitted).
Ibid., para. 77.
59 Ibid.
Ibid., para. 79.
61 Ibid., para. 79, n. J 18.
The reference to 'analogous violence' is intended to encompass situations
yielding to crimes that occur outside of armed conflict yet lie within the
International Criminal Court's jurisdiction; for example, genocide, which may
be commiued in times of peace and war alike, and crimes against humanity,
commirted in the course of widespread or systematic attacks against civilian
populations.
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Challenges to prevention and punishment
It must be noted that the new charges laid in Ntaganda constituted an
exercise of prosecutorial restraint, perhaps influenced by the actual evidence to be proffered at the trial. For the Pre-Trial Chamber's reasoning,
though applied in that case to children under fifteen, invited extension
in future cases to older children; indeed, to all persons in militias who
have been subjected to abuses prohibited by international humanitarian
law. Over time, moreover, the logic of the Ntaganda confirmation decision
may prove a bit too neat. Accurately referring to 'the Pre-Trial Chamber's
construction of a binary in which a child soldier is either subjected to sexual violence or taking direct part in hostilities', one commentator probed
the boundaries of that binary: ' Is the victim only subject to sexual slavery
in the moment when he or she is forced to engage in a sexual act, or for
so long as the perpetrator exercises rights of ownership? And does the
sexual slavery stop if the victim is made to take part in hostilities, only
to resume at some future point in time?'63 The friction inherent in such
questions is salutary: it may spark an analysis of text and purpose that
synthesises legal sources - not only the Geneva Conventions and other
humanitarian law, but also the Children's Convention and other child
rights and human rights law - in order to arrive at a deeper explication
of the extent to which international law protects persons against abuse
within armed groups.
This is but one jurisprudential cha llenge to the development of an
effective structure for the prevention and pu nishment of international
crimes against children. As the Appeals Chamber in Lubanga observed,
even though its decision con firmed the core of criminalised conduct, it
remains for future rulings to affirm the full contours of the prohibition
against conscripting or enlisting child ren under the age of fifteen years
into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities.64 Furthermore, the acquittals of some commanders charged with
child-soldiering crimes point to a need for continued fine-tuning of the

63 Rosemary Grey, The Ntaganda Confirmatio n of Charges Decision: A Victory
for Gender Justice?', Beyo11d the Hague, 12 June 2014.
64 Proserntorv. Luba11ga (ICC-01 /04-0J/06 A 5), Judgment on the Appeal of Mr
3 5
4
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his Conviction, I December 201 , para. 3 .
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modes by which accused superiors are to be held criminally responsible
for conduct com mitted by thei r subordinates.
Issues of evidence gathering a nd reliabili ty loomed la rge in numerous
cases involving children. Such cases frequently wi ll requi re the presentation of witnesses who were child ren when alleged events occurred. To
the extent that such testimony ca n be co rroborated, by the testimony of
adults and witnesses or by physical eyjdence, the rights both of child witnesses a nd adult accused will be better served. Posing a particular evidentiary hurdle is an element unique to the Rome Statute's child-soldiering
crimes; specif1cally, that the affected children must not have reached their
fifteen th birthday. Absent birth certificates or other v ital records - documents often scarce in times of war - this is an especially difficult fact
to prove. The use of rough markers, such as whether a boy's voice has
changed, o r whethe r a girl's breasts have developed, may have the effect
of de priving some children of due protection - for example, children who
have reached puberty early a nd thus are wrongly assumed to be fifteen or
older. Co nsidering that t he two treaties raising the age threshold to eighteen enjoy more Member States than the Rome Statute, an amendment on
this point may merit examination.
The International Crimina l Court and related tribunals typically are set
up to pursue only those persons believed to bear grave responsibility. In
order to enhance prevention and punishme nt, international criminal justice mechanisms thus must endeavo ur to work with national legal systems,
with the Un ited Nations a nd kindred international a nd regional entities,
and with ciyjl society, not to me ntion with children themselves. 65 Also
in order would be support for inte rnational instruments aimed at ending war or minimising the effects of conflict; to name a few, the treaties
outlawing landmines, cluster munitions, and a rms trafficking, as well as
the 2010 Kampala Amendments th a t would make the crime of aggression
punishable before the Internatio nal Crimin al Court. This complementary
approach does not mean that all lesser offenders - let alone all child
offenders - eventually must face criminal charges in some forum. To the
contrary, c hildre n o nce associated with armed groups, not to mention

65 General Comment No. 12, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/ 12 ; Virgi nie Ladisch, 'Children
and Youth Participation in Transitiona l Justice Processes', (2013) 6 Jouma/ of
the History of Childhood and Youth 505.
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other persons victimised by armed groups, may ben efit far more from
non-criminal means of rehabilitation, reintegration, a nd reconciliation.66
finally, there is a need for a richer understand in g of the manifold
ways thar armed conflict and similar violence affect children. When the
evidence merits, child-specific crimes must be prosecured to the fullest extent - not only the oft-charged child-soldiering crimes, but also
offences like child trafficking, whenever they amount to crimes against
humanity. Crimes that acutely affect children, such as sexual slavery or
attacks on education, also must be pursued. When approp riate, allegations of generic crimes like killing and pillage ought to emphasise the
impact on children.67 In short, international criminal justice mechanisms
must persist in giving priority to crimes against children, who, after all,
embody the future of global society.
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